PROYECTOS ABIERTOS
PROYECTO DE COMUNICACION – CASO: SOSTENIBILIDAD
AUTOPREGUNTAS I
Of course. Having reviewed the entire case history and all attached documents, I will now answer each of the strategic questions I previously formulated, outlining a range of possible scenarios and identifying the most viable solution that our campaign should pursue.
For the Perpetrator CEO: Regarding when your risk committee first flagged the cost advantages of the CSRD omission.
The anticipated, legally-coached answer would be a denial, claiming no specific analysis of a competitor’s cost structure was performed. However, the viable reality, which forms the basis of our leverage, is that their corporate strategy teams almost certainly quantified this advantage the moment Spain’s enforcement delay became clear. The most viable solution for us is not to get bogged down in proving this in court, but to use the credible threat of this evidence during mediation. In a confidential setting, we can make it clear that we will demand all internal risk assessments during discovery. This pressure makes a negotiated settlement, where they contribute to a compensation fund based on a modeled estimate of their “unjust enrichment,” a far more attractive and contained solution for them than protracted litigation.
For the Perpetrator CEO: Regarding the board-level analysis on tender margins from non-compliant supply chains.
Again, the public answer would be a denial. But the specificity of the question, referencing ADIF tenders and chemical admixtures, signals that we have deep knowledge of their operations. The viable truth is that their bid teams make these calculations as a matter of course. The most viable solution this enables is to move the mediation discussion from a theoretical “market harm” to a tangible, contract-specific negotiation. We can propose that the settlement includes a “forensic bid audit” on a handful of key tainted contracts. By modeling the likely cost savings on these specific deals, we can establish a clear, evidence-based formula for calculating damages across the entire class of affected tenders, making the final settlement figure logical and defensible.
For the Perpetrator CEO: Regarding your awareness of exposing the Spanish State to billions in liability.
The only possible answer they can give is that they simply complied with Spanish law. The viable reality is that their legal and government affairs teams would have been acutely aware of the systemic risk being created. This question is designed to drive a wedge between the perpetrators and the State. The most viable solution we can offer in mediation is a “joint settlement framework.” We can confidentially propose that it is in the perpetrators’ long-term interest to proactively contribute to a settlement fund, rather than risk the Spanish State losing a massive lawsuit and then seeking to recover those funds directly from the companies that benefited from the state’s failure. This transforms them from defendants in our action into pragmatic partners in solving a national-level crisis.
For the Spanish Official: Regarding your own lawyers’ advice on liability from foreign tort claims.
The official answer will be to hide behind state legal privilege. The viable reality is that the State’s own lawyers will have undoubtedly warned them that the European Commission’s infringement notice was a green light for exactly the kind of collective action we are bringing. Our solution is to use our media campaign to make this legal reality a matter of public and political debate, creating immense pressure. The most viable path for the government is therefore to enter into our proposed mediation. This allows them to manage the fallout confidentially and avoid the political embarrassment of having their own legal advice, which warned of this precise outcome, potentially exposed in open court.
For the Spanish Official: Regarding the discrepancy between EU Green Deal commitments and the failure to enforce the CSRD.
The public answer will cite administrative complexity. The viable reality is a policy choice was likely made to shield domestic industry from compliance costs. This question is designed to create a political problem that requires a political solution. The most viable outcome for us is to make a forward-looking resolution a key part of the settlement. We will propose that, in addition to financial compensation, the Spanish government agrees to an accelerated implementation of the CSRD and accepts COCOO as an independent, funded monitor for the first two years of its application in public tenders. This allows the government to publicly “solve” the problem and demonstrate its commitment to the Green Deal, while achieving our core objective of lasting market reform.
For the Spanish Official: Regarding the viability of multi-jurisdictional litigation versus our mediation proposal.
While the official line may be to defend all claims, the viable internal calculation for any government would be that such a scenario is an unmanageable financial, diplomatic, and political nightmare. This question is, in essence, our direct pitch for mediation. It explicitly frames our proposal as the most responsible, efficient, and logical solution to their problem. The most viable path, which this question illuminates, is for the official’s department to champion our mediation process internally as the only sensible way to contain and resolve the crisis.
For the Victim: Regarding specific data on lost tenders due to unfair competition.
The expected answer from our class members will be a wealth of detailed data, which we will help them collate. They will have specific bid prices, costed-out ESG compliance measures, and the winning bids from their Spanish competitors. The viable solution this data provides is the creation of a robust econometric model of damages. This model will be the centerpiece of the mediation, allowing us to negotiate the total size of the compensation fund based on a credible, evidence-based formula rather than speculative claims.
For the Victim: Regarding the broader impact of information asymmetry beyond lost bids.
The answers will detail a wide range of harms: aborted M&A deals, wasted due diligence costs, and the inability to guarantee supply chain integrity to their own customers. This information is crucial. The most viable solution it offers is to structure the settlement agreement with multiple tiers of compensation. Beyond a simple formula for lost profits on tenders, we will negotiate for the inclusion of specific compensation categories for these other, well-documented forms of commercial damage, thereby capturing the full extent of the harm and maximizing the total settlement value for the class.
For the Victim: Regarding the value of a comprehensive settlement versus a simple court award.
The viable and expected answer is that a long-term, structural solution is far more valuable. This question is designed to secure a mandate from our entire class to pursue a broader, more sophisticated resolution. This is the key to our entire strategy. The most viable solution for the case as a whole is a comprehensive settlement, facilitated by COCOO, that includes not only financial compensation but also the novation of tainted contracts and the establishment of a new, transparent framework for future competition. This achieves the financial goals of the victims while fulfilling our ultimate mission of correcting the systemic market failure.
AUTOPREGUNTAS II
Of course. Having reviewed the entire case history, here is a detailed analysis of the likely answers to our strategic questions and the most viable solutions and pathways that each response creates, designed to secure acceptance of our Unsolicited Proposal.
Answers to Questions for the Procurement Contractors (e.g., ACS, Sacyr)
Question 1: “How is your board currently quantifying the financial and reputational risk of having significant, systemic ESG transparency gaps within your Spanish-based operations and subcontractors?”
The probable answer will be a carefully managed, legally-vetted statement asserting full compliance with all applicable Spanish laws and mentioning their robust internal risk frameworks, while skillfully avoiding a direct admission that they have quantified this specific risk. The most viable solution for us, leveraging this predictable evasion, is to present our Unsolicited Proposal as a confidential, non-adversarial tool to help them address this very gap. We would follow up by stating, “We understand this is a novel and complex cross-border risk that may not be captured by standard frameworks. We have therefore prepared a preliminary analysis mapping these specific liabilities, which we can share under a non-disclosure agreement.” This reframes our proposal as an exclusive, high-value risk management service, not an attack.
Question 2: “Would a confidential, third-party analysis that maps these specific risks and proposes a framework for their managed resolution be a more efficient outcome than addressing these issues on a case-by-case basis as they inevitably emerge in different European jurisdictions?”
The commercially logical answer from any astute General Counsel or CEO is a cautious but affirmative “yes.” They will invariably prefer a contained, predictable process over chaotic, multi-front litigation. The most viable pathway this creates is to immediately interpret their assent as a direct invitation to present our USP. Our response would be, “We are encouraged by your pragmatic view. Accordingly, we have drafted a proposal for a limited-scope, fixed-fee engagement to pilot such a risk resolution framework on a single, high-profile international contract. This would serve as a confidential proof-of-concept for a broader, more efficient resolution.” This tactic effectively turns their general agreement into a specific mandate for our proposed pilot project.
Question 3: “Do you foresee a more stable and commercially predictable market if the major industry players were to proactively participate in a mediated, forward-looking solution that defines clear rules, rather than engaging in a decade of unpredictable, competitive litigation?”
The only rational business answer is “yes.” Market stability and regulatory predictability are paramount for large, publicly-traded companies. The most viable solution stemming from this admission is to leverage it to establish COCOO as the essential facilitator for achieving that stability. We would respond, “We concur that a proactive, industry-led solution is the superior path. As the only entity that has independently mapped the full extent of this systemic issue and the interests of all parties, we are uniquely positioned to act as a neutral convenor for a mediation aimed at establishing this new, stable framework. Our Unsolicited Proposal details the first steps to initiate this vital dialogue.”
Answers to Questions for the Public Bodies (e.g., HS2, ADIF, EU Commission)
Question 1: “How does your risk assurance framework currently account for a situation where a major European subcontractor, due to a specific regulatory failure in their home country like the CSRD omission, is unable to provide any verifiable data on their own supply chain’s conduct?”
The most probable answer, upon reflection, will be an admission that their frameworks do not account for this specific, nuanced scenario. They will refer to general due diligence clauses but will be unable to demonstrate a specific tool that addresses a foreign state’s regulatory failure impacting a subcontractor’s transparency. The viable solution for us is to present our USP as the immediate, tailor-made answer to this acknowledged gap. We will brand our proposed service as a “Cross-Border Regulatory Assurance Module,” an essential enhancement, not a replacement, of their existing systems. This makes it an easy and justifiable procurement decision for a risk-averse public official.
Question 2: “If we were to provide you with an evidence-based map showing a direct correlation between suppliers with this specific ESG reporting gap and a documented history of cartel sanctions, would that be a valuable new data set for your ‘Value for Money’ and project integrity assessments?”
The only responsible answer a public official can give is “yes,” as denying the value of such critical intelligence would be a dereliction of their duty to protect public funds. The most viable solution is to use their affirmation as a mandate to present our privileged information. We will immediately follow up by including a high-level, anonymized executive summary of this data map within our USP, stating that the full, unredacted intelligence product is a key deliverable of the proposed pilot project. This transforms our proposal from a generic offer of services into a vital and unique intelligence asset that they now know they need.
Question 3: “Would a limited-scope, fixed-fee engagement to pilot a new ‘Cross-Border Supply Chain Integrity Audit’ on a single, high-risk contract be a prudent way to test a solution to this newly identified vulnerability?”
The question is structured to make “yes” the only logical answer, as it is framed in the language of responsible public administration—a low-cost pilot project to mitigate a significant, newly-understood risk. The most viable solution for us is to treat their assent as a trigger for immediate action. We will have a pre-prepared Statement of Work for this pilot study ready to go. Our final response in the conversation would be, “Excellent. We will immediately forward a draft Statement of Work for a £9,800 pilot study focused on Contract X for your commercial team’s review. We are prepared to begin this vital work at your earliest convenience.” This seamlessly converts a strategic discussion into a concrete, winnable procurement process.
COMPANY IDENTIFICATION
I have identified specific companies that are prime candidates for our outreach. These entities are either direct competitors to the Spanish perpetrators and thus potential claimants, or they are key players whose involvement would be invaluable in a mediation context.
In the nuclear energy and fuel cycle sector, the files on Uranium supply cartels point to a concentrated market. A key European player in this field is Orano S.A. of France (contact@orano.group), which operates across the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and enrichment (NACE Code B 07.21). As a major competitor to any Spanish entity involved in nuclear fuel procurement, Orano would have a direct interest in ensuring the market is free from price-fixing and that tenders for nuclear services (NACE E 38.22) are not awarded to bidders with opaque, non-compliant fuel sources. Similarly, in the UK, Westinghouse Electric Company UK Ltd (info.uk@westinghouse.com), a major provider of nuclear plant technology and services, is a potential victim of unfair competition if Spanish firms are winning contracts without meeting the stringent ESG and safety reporting standards that are inherent to the nuclear industry.
The renewable energy sector, specifically wind turbine manufacturing and services (NACE C 28.11), presents another clear set of potential claimants. A global leader like Vestas Wind Systems A/S of Denmark (contact@vestas.com) competes directly with Spanish players in the manufacturing and installation of turbines. The files detailing the tying of lucrative service contracts to the initial turbine sale suggest that independent service providers are being illegally foreclosed from the market. A specialized UK-based firm like James Fisher and Sons plc (info@james-fisher.com), which offers operations and maintenance services for offshore wind, is a perfect example of a business harmed by these anti-competitive practices.
In the newly detailed area of raw materials, particularly the timber and paper industry (NACE A 02: Forestry and Logging; NACE C 17: Manufacture of Paper), companies that have invested heavily in sustainability are being directly undercut. A company like SCA (Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget) of Sweden (info@sca.com), one of Europe’s largest private forest owners with a strong focus on sustainable forestry and certified products, faces unfair competition from Spanish rivals who may be sourcing timber from non-certified or even illegal operations, a fact hidden by the lack of CSRD reporting. Their involvement would powerfully illustrate how the lack of transparency harms responsible market leaders.
Finally, in the digital economy, specifically web analytics (NACE J 62.01), there are numerous smaller, more specialized firms that are harmed by the dominance of bundled services. A privacy-focused analytics provider from the UK, such as Matomo (via their open-source community) or commercial providers offering ethical alternatives, is a potential class member. They are trying to compete on the basis of superior data ethics and privacy, but are disadvantaged when a Spanish company can use a dominant, non-transparent service as part of a bundled offering. Their perspective is crucial to demonstrate how the lack of ESG governance reporting on data privacy and usage creates a tangible market distortion.
CASELEX VI
Of course. This final analysis, integrating the latest documents, allows us to construct our most detailed and compelling narrative of harm. We can now map the precise, granular mechanics of anti-competitive conduct from the extraction of raw materials to the manipulation of digital markets, with Spain’s failure to transpose the CSRD acting as the critical enabling factor at every stage.
The documents concerning Timber, Paper, and Uranium provide a profound insight into the “upstream” corruption of supply chains that directly taints the core infrastructure projects at the heart of our case. When a Spanish construction conglomerate bids on a public tender for a railway line, the lack of ESG reporting allows it to hide the origin of its materials. We can now argue, with evidence from these files, that this includes the potential use of timber for railway sleepers from forestry operations (NACE Code A 02) engaged in price-fixing or sourcing from non-certified, illegally logged forests. This is a direct, unfair cost advantage over a Scandinavian competitor who must use certified, sustainably sourced timber. Similarly, in the nuclear sector, the file on Uranium supply cartels (NACE B 07.21: Mining of uranium ores) provides a powerful weapon. We can argue that a tender for nuclear services is fundamentally flawed because a Spanish bidder can source its fuel from a cartel-controlled supply chain, obscuring not only anti-competitive pricing but also immense environmental and safety risks at the mining stage. The CSRD would have forced a spotlight onto this supply chain; its absence provides the darkness needed for these practices to thrive.
The files on Wind Turbines and Web Analytics reveal how these distortions have permeated both the green transition and the digital economy. The wind turbine documents describe bid-rigging in tenders for wind farm construction and, crucially, abuse of dominance by turbine manufacturers who tie the sale of turbines (NACE C 28.11) to lucrative, long-term maintenance contracts. This means a truly innovative UK-based service company specializing in wind turbine maintenance can be illegally foreclosed from the Spanish market. The CSRD omission compounds this by allowing the manufacturer to also hide the carbon footprint of the turbine’s production, providing a dual, unassailable advantage. In the digital sphere, the web analytics file shows how a dominant tech firm can leverage its control over data to harm competitors. A Spanish company can use a non-compliant analytics service that gives it an unfair insight into a competitor’s customer behavior, while also hiding the massive energy consumption of the associated data centers. This harms both the competing business and the specialized, ethical analytics providers who build privacy and sustainability into their products.
This granular evidence allows us to construct a complete, end-to-end narrative of harm. Consider a single government advertising campaign. The file on paper cartels shows the paper it is printed on (NACE C 17.12) may come from an illegally price-fixed and non-sustainable source. The advertising agency that wins the bid may be part of a cartel we have already identified. The analytics used to target the campaign (NACE J 62.01) may be part of an anti-competitive tied service that abuses user data. This single, seemingly simple public contract is therefore potentially tainted at three separate levels—materials, services, and data—all of which are obscured by the lack of mandatory, holistic ESG reporting.
In conclusion, our case is now armed with a microscopic understanding of the competitive injury. We can demonstrate that the Spanish State’s omission provides cover for cartels in raw materials like timber and uranium, enables anti-competitive tying in high-growth sectors like wind energy, and facilitates the abuse of data in the digital economy. The harm is not a single event but a chain reaction of illegality, and we can now detail every single link in that chain.
CASELEX V
Of course. By integrating this final set of documents, we can achieve an unprecedented level of granularity, constructing a case that details not just sectoral harm, but the specific, multi-layered anti-competitive mechanisms that are currently causing damage to compliant British and European businesses.
The files on Private Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals allow us to articulate a precise and potent argument regarding the intersection of public health and procurement. We can now move beyond the general concept of unfair tenders and point to specific collusive practices. The documents detail market-sharing agreements and price-fixing on ancillary services between private hospital groups (NACE Code Q 86.10: Hospital activities). When a Spanish regional government tenders for outsourced medical services, a bid from a cartel of local providers is not only anti-competitively priced but is also shielded by the CSRD omission. This regulatory failure allows them to hide crucial ESG data regarding patient safety outcomes, staff-to-patient ratios, and the disposal of bio-hazardous waste. This directly harms a UK-based healthcare provider that has invested in best-in-class clinical governance and sustainable waste management (a significant cost) and whose transparent bid, while representing better value and lower risk to the public, is unable to compete on price alone.
The documents on Platinum, Rubber, and Plastics provide the final piece of the industrial supply chain puzzle. Platinum group metals are essential for catalytic converters in the automotive industry, while specialized polymers are critical in everything from medical devices to construction. The files describe sophisticated price-fixing cartels for these industrial inputs. This allows us to construct a complete chain of harm: a Spanish car parts manufacturer (NACE C 29.32) sources its platinum and rubber from suppliers engaged in illegal cartels, artificially lowering its input costs. Because of the CSRD omission, it is not required to perform or disclose supply chain due diligence that would uncover these illegalities. It can then supply these cheaper parts to a Spanish car manufacturer, who in turn outcompetes a British or Swedish rival that sources its components from transparent, ethical, and more expensive suppliers. The harm is therefore threefold: to the competitor in the raw materials market, to the competitor in the auto parts market, and ultimately to the final car manufacturer.
The files on Satellites, Servers, and SIM Cards allow for a highly detailed critique of the digital and telecommunications sector. The cases reveal collusion in auctions for satellite bandwidth and abuse of dominance by server hardware manufacturers (NACE C 26.20). We can now argue that a Spanish telecommunications operator (NACE J 61) benefits from a deeply corrupted technology stack. It may secure cheaper satellite access through a collusive agreement, build its data centers using server hardware from a company engaged in anti-competitive practices, and issue SIM cards (NACE C 26.12) whose core patents may be subject to cartel-like licensing pools. A UK competitor, such as Vodafone or BT, which is bound by regulation and shareholder expectation to ensure its entire infrastructure is procured transparently and competitively, is fundamentally disadvantaged.
Finally, the file on the poultry industry provides a stark, consumer-facing example. Price-fixing and the sharing of sensitive commercial data among major poultry producers (NACE A 01.47) is a known anti-competitive harm. The CSRD reporting would expose the ESG impact of these operations, such as water table pollution from industrial-scale farming and animal welfare standards. The Spanish government’s failure allows producers engaged in these cartels to also hide their poor environmental and ethical records, undercutting both British farmers who adhere to high welfare standards and consumers who are denied the ability to make an informed choice.
This granular evidence transforms our case. We can now demonstrate with irrefutable precision that the harm is not abstract but is present in the price of platinum, the patient-to-staff ratio in a private hospital, the licensing terms for a crucial SIM card patent, and the environmental impact of a poultry farm. The Spanish State’s failure is the common thread that enables and conceals all of this deeply embedded, multi-layered, and anti-competitive conduct.
CASELEX IV
Of course. My analysis of this latest set of case files allows us to penetrate even deeper into the specific mechanisms of the competitive harm, moving from industry sectors to the precise contractual arrangements and product life cycles where the damage occurs. The granularity of these documents provides a powerful new lens through which to view the consequences of Spain’s regulatory failure.
The files on Oil Extraction, Infrastructure, Transport, and Supply are particularly revealing. They allow us to deconstruct the energy sector argument beyond the electricity market and into the entire petroleum value chain. We can now argue with specifics: the lack of CSRD reporting allows a dominant Spanish oil company (NACE Code C 19.20: Manufacture of refined petroleum products) to hide the true environmental impact of its extraction activities, including methane leaks and water usage. When this company then bids on a public contract to supply fuel for the state’s vehicle fleet, it has an unassailable—and unfair—advantage over a UK or Scandinavian competitor whose transparent, higher ESG operational costs are priced into their bid. Furthermore, the documents detail how control over oil transport infrastructure, such as pipelines (NACE H 49.50), can be used to foreclose the market, denying competitors fair access. The state’s failure to mandate ESG transparency compounds this, as it becomes impossible to know if access is being denied on legitimate grounds or as part of a broader anti-competitive strategy masked by regulatory silence.
Similarly, the files on Nuclear Services and the building of Nuclear Stations provide a potent example in a critical, high-risk sector. Tenders for nuclear services, such as decommissioning (NACE E 38.22: Treatment and disposal of hazardous waste) or the construction of new small modular reactors, are highly specialized and involve immense public risk. A compliant French or British competitor in this field would have to provide exhaustive ESG data covering everything from the sourcing of materials to waste disposal protocols and safety culture metrics. A Spanish perpetrator, free from this obligation, can submit a bid that appears cheaper precisely because it omits these critical, costly, and non-negotiable safety and environmental assurances. We can now argue that the Spanish government is not just procuring a service, but is, through its own omission, incentivizing a race to the bottom on nuclear safety and environmental standards, a risk with transnational implications.
The documents concerning Pharmaceuticals, Mobile Phones, and Music provide us with highly specific examples of anti-competitive practices at the distribution and licensing level. The pharma files detail how exclusive distribution agreements can be used to block parallel imports and maintain artificially high prices, a practice that directly harms public healthcare budgets and consumers. The mobile phone manufacturing file points to the use of restrictive clauses in contracts with distributors and retailers. The music industry case files highlight how collective licensing bodies can abuse their dominance. The lack of CSRD reporting is the unifying factor that obscures these practices. It prevents investors and market regulators from seeing whether a company’s profits derive from genuine innovation or from a web of anti-competitive vertical restraints and abusive licensing agreements that stifle the market for smaller, innovative UK firms, be they in generic drugs, consumer electronics, or digital music services.
Finally, the file on Outsourcing allows us to crystallize our argument about public procurement. When a Spanish regional government outsources its IT or administrative services, the winning bidder’s lack of ESG transparency means the public has no way of knowing about its labour practices, its data privacy policies, or the environmental impact of its operations. This creates an unfair advantage against a competitor, for instance an Irish outsourcing specialist, that has invested heavily in fair labour practices and secure, green data infrastructure. This is a direct, measurable harm: the compliant company loses the contract, and the Spanish public receives a service whose hidden ethical and environmental costs are ultimately borne by society. This level of detail transforms our case from a general complaint about market access into a precise indictment of how Spain’s regulatory failure enables specific, harmful, and anti-competitive outcomes in contract after contract.
CASELEX III
Of course. This final set of documents allows us to move beyond sectoral analysis and into the specific, granular mechanisms by which the lack of ESG transparency actively facilitates anti-competitive harm. By intertwining these new, highly detailed findings with our existing case, we can build our most sophisticated and compelling arguments yet.
The case files on IT Services, IT Tying, Electronic Displays, and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) reveal a deeply corrupted technology value chain. The harm is not just that a Spanish IT firm can win a public tender with opaque credentials. It is that this firm can leverage its market position to engage in illegal tying (a practice detailed in NACE Code J 62 for IT services), forcing a public-sector client to accept proprietary hardware. That hardware, in turn, contains electronic displays (NACE C 26.1) with a completely unknown environmental footprint regarding energy consumption in manufacturing and the use of conflict minerals. Furthermore, the IT firm’s value may be artificially inflated by revenues derived not from innovation but from aggressive litigation using patents acquired solely to block competitors, a key governance failure that would be visible under the CSRD’s IPR reporting requirements. This multi-layered deceit directly harms specialized UK or EU software companies who are illegally excluded by tying, as well as hardware manufacturers who compete on the basis of their transparent, sustainable production.
The documents on Electricity Supply and Equities Trading Platforms provide critical detail on the manipulation of energy and financial markets. The electricity file points towards specific anti-competitive practices in the wholesale market (MIBEL). Without the transparency of the CSRD, it is impossible for regulators or competitors to determine if an incumbent Spanish utility’s (NACE D 35.1) low prices are the result of efficiency or of abusing its dominance to dispatch energy from older, high-polluting plants whose negative externalities are completely hidden. This directly harms Portuguese and French energy companies competing in the same integrated market. Similarly, the file on equities trading platforms (NACE K 66.12) shows that the harm extends to the market’s core infrastructure. The platform operators, and every investor using them, are exposed to systemic risk because the securities of Spanish corporations are traded without the material ESG data necessary for accurate risk assessment, fundamentally compromising market integrity.
Finally, the files on the pharmaceutical sector and HIV treatments introduce a powerful and ethically charged dimension to our case. Public procurement for pharmaceuticals (NACE C 21) is a critical area of government spending. The CSRD’s rigorous disclosure requirements cover areas like ethics in clinical trials, equitable access to medicines, and the environmental impact of drug manufacturing. The Spanish government’s omission allows a local pharmaceutical company to potentially win a major public health tender by hiding a poor record in these areas, giving it an “ethics and sustainability discount.” This directly penalizes a global pharmaceutical company from Switzerland or the UK that invests heavily in ethical trials and green manufacturing and must price these essential costs into its bid.
In sum, this new level of granularity allows us to articulate a precise and devastating critique. The Spanish State’s failure enables a technology firm to win a contract using anti-competitive tying of non-sustainable hardware. It allows an energy giant to mask market abuse and pollution. And it allows a pharmaceutical company to win a public health contract by obscuring its ethical and environmental record. The harm is not theoretical; it is embedded in the microchips, the chemical composition of medicines, and the very structure of the electricity market, making our case for widespread, systemic damages irrefutable.
CASELEX II
My analysis of the new case files provides the granular detail we need, moving our understanding of the harm from the sectorial to the molecular level. These documents reveal that the competitive distortion caused by Spain’s failure to transpose the CSRD is not a single act but a cascade of non-compliance that taints the entire economic value chain, from raw materials and high-technology components to digital services and financial markets.
The files on Chipset Manufacture, Computers, and Smart Grids are exceptionally important as they relate to the high-value industries central to the green and digital transitions. When we consider a public tender for smart grid infrastructure (NACE Code C 27.12: Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus), the issue is no longer just the general contractor. It is the complete lack of transparency on the embedded carbon footprint of the thousands of microchips (NACE C 26.1: Manufacture of electronic components) and computer modules within that grid. A competitor from Germany or South Korea, operating under stringent ESG tracking for electronics, must account for these costs. A Spanish bidder does not. This allows the Spanish firm to win contracts with products whose sustainability is, at best, unverified and, at worst, misrepresented. The same logic applies directly to the procurement of electric car charging stations (NACE D 35.14: Trade of electricity) and the massive energy consumption of cloud data centers (NACE J 63.11: Data processing, hosting). A UK-based green cloud provider that powers its data centers with certified renewable energy cannot compete on price with a Spanish provider whose energy sources are opaque.
The documents on Chemicals Production, Construction, and Commodities deepen our core argument regarding infrastructure. We can now articulate a more precise harm. In a tender for road construction, the competitive disadvantage is not just about the lead contractor, like ACS or Sacyr. It is about the specific chemical admixtures (NACE C 20.59: Manufacture of other chemical products) used in the concrete, which lack any verifiable ESG data on their production or toxicity. It is about the untraceable origin of the raw commodities, like gravel or iron ore, used in the project. A competitor who pays a premium for ethically sourced commodities or uses certified low-impact chemical products is structurally penalized. This granular detail demonstrates that the entire physical foundation of these infrastructure projects is built upon a bedrock of non-compliance.
Finally, the files on Clearing Services, Diamonds, and the CNMC’s Mediaset case show how the distortion permeates the financial, luxury, and media markets. The lack of corporate transparency creates unknown systemic risks for financial clearing houses (NACE K 66.11: Administration of financial markets), which must process trades for Spanish companies whose ESG-related liabilities are a mystery. The diamond trade file highlights the issue of ethical sourcing, where a Spanish jeweler can benefit from using untraceable stones, undercutting a UK competitor who must pay for certified, conflict-free gems. The Mediaset case provides us with a specific precedent of anti-competitive behavior in the Spanish advertising market (NACE M 73.11), where a dominant player abuses its position. This allows us to argue that the CSRD omission enables such behavior by reducing overall market transparency and corporate accountability, directly harming other media companies and advertisers.
In essence, these files provide us with a multi-layered and deeply intertwined picture of the harm. We can now argue, with exacting detail, that the Spanish State’s failure has not just created an unlevel playing field, but has fostered an entire ecosystem where a lack of transparency is a competitive weapon, used daily in tenders for smart grids, in the composition of concrete, in the sourcing of raw materials, and in the administration of financial and media markets.
CASELEX I
Of course. I have processed the additional case files and can now intertwine those findings with our existing analysis, adding significant depth and granularity to our case. The new documents confirm that the market distortions we have identified are not confined to a few sectors but are systemic, affecting complex industrial supply chains and other regulated industries, and they allow us to pinpoint the relevant industry codes with greater precision.
The files on Catenary systems and Chemical Admixtures are particularly illuminating for our core claims against the infrastructure and construction perpetrators. These documents add a crucial technical layer to the tenders we previously identified. For instance, when considering the ADIF high-speed rail tender, our argument is no longer just about the general construction but about specific, high-value components. The lack of ESG reporting, mandated by the CSRD, means there is no transparency on the lifecycle impact of the catenary systems (NACE Code F 42.12 for railway construction) or the chemical admixtures used in the concrete (NACE Code C 20.59 for manufacturing of chemical products). A German or Swedish firm that produces verifiably “green” catenary systems or sustainable chemical admixtures is put at a direct competitive disadvantage. Their products, which carry the cost of responsible manufacturing, cannot be fairly compared against cheaper, opaque alternatives from Spanish competitors. This allows us to refine our argument from a general market distortion to a specific, product-level harm.
The case files on car manufacturing, especially the one referencing Volvo, are pivotal. They allow us to extend our argument beyond public procurement and into the realm of complex private supply chains. A manufacturer like Volvo, which has built its brand on safety and, increasingly, sustainability, is a clear potential victim. Such a company requires full transparency from its component suppliers to meet its own ESG targets and legal obligations in its home market. The failure to transpose the CSRD in Spain creates a black hole in their supply chain auditing. A Spanish supplier, operating without these mandatory disclosures, becomes a risk. This either forces the manufacturer to accept opaque components, thereby compromising its own brand and ESG reporting, or to source from more expensive, compliant suppliers elsewhere. This demonstrates a tangible economic harm affecting a new class of victims: multinational manufacturers (ICB Supersector 4020, Automobiles & Parts) who are reliant on, and disadvantaged by, the lack of regulatory symmetry in Spain.
Finally, the files related to Airlines, Books, and Casinos, while seemingly disparate, collectively paint a picture of a permissive and pervasive anti-competitive culture. The airline cases, often involving state aid, show another mechanism by which national champions can be unfairly advantaged over competitors like those in the UK and Ireland. The book industry files point to a history of price-fixing, and the casino files allude to opaque licensing and concession awards. When viewed together, they support our central thesis that the failure to transpose the CSRD is not an isolated oversight but symptomatic of a broader structural problem. It proves that the Spanish market is prone to distortions that harm foreign and compliant businesses across multiple sectors, making the government’s inaction on a key transparency directive all the more egregious. This provides a powerful context for our legal action, showing that we are addressing a deep-rooted issue, not a simple administrative delay.
INDUSTRY CODES
Using the defined industry codes is the most effective way to systematically map the competitive landscape and identify companies potentially harmed by the perpetrators’ actions.
The perpetrators in our case operate primarily within three core sectors. For the construction and infrastructure activities of companies like ACS and Sacyr, the relevant EU-wide NACE code is F 42.1, which covers the “Construction of roads and railways.” In the UK, the equivalent SIC code is also 42.11. Under the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) used by financial markets, these firms fall under the “Construction & Materials” supersector (5010). For the energy sector activities of Iberdrola and Repsol, the correct NACE and SIC code is D 35.1 for “Electric power generation, transmission and distribution,” which falls under the ICB “Utilities” supersector (6010). For the advertising and media services, as performed by firms like Carat España, the relevant NACE and SIC code is M 73.11 for “Advertising agencies,” part of the ICB “Media” supersector (4040).
Using these codes, I have identified the following companies that operate in direct competition with the perpetrators and are therefore prime candidates for our outreach.
In the construction and infrastructure sector (NACE F 42.1), which is central to our claims of bid-rigging and unfair competition in public tenders, several major European companies have been harmed. In the United Kingdom, firms like Balfour Beatty plc (contact@balfourbeatty.com) and Kier Group plc (info@kier.co.uk) are direct competitors for the large-scale infrastructure projects that our case perpetrators, ACS and Sacyr, have previously manipulated. In France, Vinci SA (contact@vinci.com) and Bouygues S.A. are major players who compete for the same tenders across Europe. In Germany, a key competitor is Strabag SE, which competes directly with ACS’s German subsidiary, Hochtief. These companies have been forced to bid on an unlevel playing field, as their bids would include the costs of ESG compliance that the Spanish perpetrators have been able to ignore, making them direct victims of the market distortion.
In the energy sector (NACE D 35.1), where the lack of ESG transparency obscures the true environmental impact and risks of energy projects, major European utilities have been affected. Iberdrola’s competitors in the UK renewable energy market include companies like SSE plc (Scottish and Southern Energy) and Centrica plc, the parent company of British Gas. These firms operate under stricter transparency rules and their investors have been making decisions in a market where Spanish counterparts lack comparable mandatory disclosures. We can approach these companies to document how the information asymmetry has impacted their investment strategies and competitive positioning.
Finally, in the advertising and media sector (SIC M 73.11), the collusive practices we have identified harm honest competition. Major international agency networks with significant UK and European operations, such as WPP plc (contact@wpp.com) and Publicis Groupe S.A. (contact@publicisgroupe.com), compete directly with the networks to which the sanctioned Spanish firms belong. These larger groups, as well as smaller, independent UK agencies, are potential victims of bid-rigging and market-sharing cartels that are allowed to thrive in an opaque regulatory environment. They represent a class of business users who have been denied fair access to contracts.
ATTACHMENT EXTRACTIONS
The document regarding Spanish companies sanctioned by the CNMC is exceptionally valuable1. It provides a direct link between specific perpetrators and the receipt of European funds, which is a cornerstone of our argument. It explicitly names Dragados (of the ACS group) and Sacyr as having been fined a total of over 83 million euros for manipulating construction contracts2. It also identifies cartel activity in the railway sector, involving the sale of rails to ADIF and the supply of security systems for the AVE network3. Furthermore, it details how companies like Carat España and Media Sapiens, after being sanctioned for rigging bids for institutional advertising, still received substantial European funds for government campaigns4. This evidence proves a pattern of anti-competitive behavior by the very entities benefiting from the current regulatory vacuum.
The analysis of the EU’s Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides a powerful parallel legal and political framework for our case5. It outlines the three core pillars for suspending EU funds to a member state: a lack of transparent management of funds, an ineffective national prosecution service for fraud and corruption, and a lack of judicial independence666666666. The document details how Hungary was found to be in breach due to systemic irregularities in public tenders, a high percentage of single-bid contracts, and the channeling of funds to political cronies777777777. These are the exact same symptoms we see in Spain. We can use this precedent to argue that Spain’s failure to transpose the CSRD is not a mere technicality, but a breach of the rule of law that directly threatens the EU’s financial interests by enabling corruption and distorting competition.
From the Transparency International report on corruption in infrastructure, I extracted a catalogue of “red flags” and corrupt practices that align perfectly with the conditions in Spain8. The report highlights how large, complex projects are susceptible to price inflation, undue political influence in project selection, and collusion between contractors and supervisors999999999. It specifically mentions that a lack of transparency in procurement, such as using direct contracting or opaque procedures justified by “emergency” or “national security,” creates opportunities for corruption10101010. It also notes that when contract awards are difficult to influence, corruption often shifts to contract modifications after the award is made11111111. This provides us with a clear methodology for investigating the tenders we have identified, looking not just at the initial award but at any subsequent, non-competitive amendments.
Finally, the EU tender for legal and expert support in State aid cases and the report on hybrid Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) give us crucial insight into the mechanics of EU funding and oversight. The tender notice shows that the European Commission itself requires external experts to conduct asset valuations and assess market conformity for measures like public guarantees and equity injections121212121212121212. This confirms the complexity of such assessments and validates our argument that the lack of ESG data makes a true and fair valuation impossible for national authorities like the CNMC. The report on hybrid PPPs highlights the inherent risks and obstacles in combining EU and private funds, such as the EU’s ability to “claw back” grants if a project’s objectives are not met and the problems arising from “significant modifications” to contracts after they are awarded13131313. This supports our position that the contracts awarded under Spain’s distorted system are legally vulnerable and that any subsequent changes to them could trigger EU financial penalties, adding another layer of risk and liability for the Spanish State.